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Introduction 
The broad objective of this paper is to better understand how national governments 
form their policy position on the Draft Constitutional proposal by analysing 
developments in Spain. It does so in three sections. After first considering different 
(theoretical) issues raised in Spanish policy-making literature, Section 1 examines the 
Spanish position on various parts of the European Convention based on data gathered 
from expert interviews carried out in November 2003. Beyond analysing the overall 
data, we examine and explain why one of Spain’s most important concerns relates to 
the ‘qualified majority’ threshold. Section 2 then evaluates the internal coordination 
process, focusing on the few domestic-level actors (from the Prime Ministers’ Office 
and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economy) that have been most influential in 
shaping the Spanish position. Building on issues raised in Spanish political literature, 
we then consider two main explanations regarding why the process involved such few 
actors. The first of them points to the significance of specific institutional actors 
whose (economic and social) policy-making role in Spain has been embedded since 
the mid-1980s. We argue that this institutionalisation has resulted in the limited role 
of parliament (las Cortes), opposition actors and other interest groups. A second 
explanation, pointing to the importance of party politics, relates to the ‘political will’ 
of the Popular Party (PP) administration: driven by a ‘new’ paradigm for Spanish 
foreign policy, the PP shifted attention towards forging transatlantic relations while 
‘strengthening’ the Spanish position vis-à-vis European superpowers such as 
Germany and France. Such a ‘paradigm’ further cemented the position of some actors 
in the process, while it necessarily excluded others. From a theoretical perspective, 
and based on the existing Spanish policy-making literature mentioned above, the 
paper concludes that domestic level negotiation has thus taken place in a relatively 
closed, yet informal, policy-community, comprising a limited number of actors 
working in isolation. Section 3 closes with our main findings and also ponders the 
potential shift in the Spanish position given the recent Socialist victory in March 
2004. 
 
 
 
 
 Section 1. Theoretical Issues, Survey Data, and Why Madrid Loves Nice 
Theoretical Issues in Spanish Public Policy Making 
Various scholars have made different attempts to theoretically characterise policy-
making in contemporary Spain, guided by larger policy-making models developed in 
comparative politics literature. A main body of literature (Pérez Díaz, 1993) points to 
the corporatist tradition in Spain, most acute throughout the transition to democracy 
(1977-1982). Clearly guided by the larger corporatist literature, as seen in Schmitter 
and Lembruch’s (1979) work, it is contended that specific interests –particularly 
capital and labour– who enjoy a monopoly of representation, had fixed positions 
along with the state in the formulation of economic and social policies. A clear 
example of this was seen in the Moncloa Pacts of the late 1970s, where the state, 
along with representatives of capital (in the form of the business organisation CEOE) 
as well as the two main trade unions (UGT and CCOO) arrived at a national 
agreement (on issues such as wages) that eventually served as a basis for the state’s 
economic growth, employment expansion and increased living standards throughout 
the 1980s. 
 
Transcending the corporatist model, a second school points to the importance of 
economic elites in formulating public policy. Specifically focusing on developments 
by the Socialist Party after 1986, and highlighting ideas raised by Instrumental 
Marxists (Miliband, 1969), the argument here is that economic actors, such as 
corporate firms, dictated policy positions taken by the government (Petras, 1993). 
Different public policies that serve as examples include a tax policy that benefited the 
rich and some sales of state-owned companies to economic elites for a price below 
their market value. According to Petras, these and other neo-liberal policies, along 
with simultaneous cuts in health, welfare and education programmes were pursued 
particularly in the last years of Felipe Gonzalez’s Socialist administration. 
 
A more recent model, discussed by R.A.W Rhodes and Peterson, is the ‘policy 
network’ approach (Rhodes, 1997; Peterson, 1995), which has recently been applied 
to understanding developments in the Spanish privatisation and state aid policy-
making processes (Chari, 2004). This approach is different from the previous schools 
in two aspects: unlike corporatism, there is no fixed, tripartite power consisting of the 
state, labour and capital that rules when public policy is made; and unlike elitism, it is 
argued that there is no exclusive and privileged position for private (economic) actors 
who can unilaterally impose decisions. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the 
network approach evolved into different typologies and was applied to a variety of 
areas and it can be argued that Marsh and Rhodes (1992), building on the work of 
Grant et al (1988) and Rhodes (1988), offered a definitive, although not final, 
clarification of terms in network/community analysis. The Marsh-Rhodes typology 
suggests that there are four main characteristics of a community. First, there are a 
limited number of participants that operate in a largely insulated fashion while others 
are consciously excluded, pointing to a highly restrictive membership. Second, there 
is interaction between members when an issue is discussed, each of whom have their 
own goals. Third, there is a consensus between actors as well as a consistency in 
values, membership and policy outcomes shared by them, pointing to a ‘policy 
paradigm’, or a view of the world which consists of the most urgent problems that 
need to be dealt with. Fourth, the interaction between members, which may be 
hierarchical in nature, is based on bargaining between members. 
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 While offering significant insights, it can be argued that Spanish policy-making 
literature suffers from three main insufficiencies. First, analysis of policy-making has 
been primarily concerned about understanding economic and social policy-issues. In 
other words, less attention has been paid to how Spain has developed its external 
policy positions. Second, while there are in-depth studies on the importance of the 
various institutions within the state that have increasingly gained power, such as the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance (Heywood, 1995), little attention has been paid to 
the coordination of these institutions when foreign policy is developed. Third, while 
the analysis of public opinion and elite surveys have led to studies on elections and 
political parties (Montero, 1998), less effort has been made to use elite surveys in the 
study of public policy development in general, and external policies in particular. This 
is particularly the case in studies analysing Spain’s position towards the EU and 
integration initiatives. 
 
Attempting to transcend these deficiencies, one of the main objectives of this paper is 
to therefore better understand, both empirically and theoretically, the development of 
the Spanish position on the Draft Constitutional proposal by analysing responses to 
the DOSEI group’s elite surveys and by considering the role of various actors in the 
process. As such, the rest of Section 1 examines the Spanish position on the 
Constitution, highlighting Spain’s main concerns on the qualified majority threshold. 
Before considering which theoretical model is of use in characterising the policy 
process with respect to the development of the national position on the Draft 
Constitution, Section 2 analyses the actors that have been important in developing this 
position and evaluates the factors that explain it. To this end, specific attention will be 
given to both the institutional dimensions of governance in Spain and the ‘political 
will’ of the PP administration. 
 
Spain’s View on the European Convention: Examining the Survey Data 
This section seeks to understand the Spanish view of the European Convention based 
on the DOSEI research group’s (Principal Investigator Thomas König) expert 
surveys. Using the data of the two experts that were interviewed in November 2003, 
both of whom are representative of high-level officials in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Office, two types of comparisons can be made as 
shown in Table 1. The first, as seen in the first two columns, relates to the level of 
agreement between the expert’s view of the national position (formed by the main 
governmental actors involved in the process) and the provisions as established in the 
Draft Constitution. Key to note at this stage, as discussed further below, is that there 
are three main actors involved in forming the Spanish position: The Prime Ministers’ 
Office (PMO), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance (MEH). Both interviewees also suggested that the positions of all three of 
these actors were always the same as the official governmental position (therefore 
pointing to the idea of ‘no variance’ between the main actors involved). A second 
comparison, as shown in the last column, relates to the level of agreement between the 
two experts that were interviewed. 
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 Table 1. Level of Agreement in Responses 
Notes: Total number of questions in brackets; higher percentages in bold (over 70% coincidence in answers). 
 
Expert 1: Official 
Government Position 
and Agreement with 
Draft Constitution 
Expert 2: Official 
Government Position 
and Agreement with 
Draft Constitution 
Agreement in 
Responses Between 
Expert 1 and Expert 2 
Survey Section    
General (7) 4/7 (0.57) 
4/7 
(0.57) 
6/7 
(0.86) 
Legal Instruments (6) 2/2 (1) 
2/2 
(1) 
2/2 
(1) 
Institutions & Procedures 
(10) 
6/10 
(0.6) 
6/10 
(0.6) 
7/10 
(0.7) 
Policies (42) 36/42 (0.86) 
30/42 
(0.71) 
30/42 
(0.71) 
Priorities (1)   1/1 (1) 
    
Total (66) 51/66 (0.77) 
47/66 
(0.71) 
49/66 
(0.74) 
 
The data suggest two main findings. The first, as seen in the final column, is that there 
is a high consistency in responses between the experts. This is seen in the ‘general’ 
‘legal instruments’, ‘policies’ and ‘priorities’ sections of the questionnaire. This 
suggests that the data are reliable given that both experts agreed on a majority of the 
questions. The second main finding, as seen in Columns 1 and 2, is that the official 
government position generally shows a high level of agreement with the issues raised 
in the Draft Constitution. Although one finds high agreement in sections on ‘legal 
instruments’ and ‘policies,’ less agreement is seen in two other sections, however. 
The first is the ‘General’ section, where the official government position towards ‘free 
market’ and ‘reference to Christianity’ differs from the Draft Constitution’s stance on 
‘social market economy’ and ‘reference to a religious inheritance’. The second section 
where differences are seen relates to that on ‘institutions and procedures.’ For 
example, one sees that Spain prefers involvement of member states in the 
appointment of commissioners and that the importance of the Council should be 
maintained in external policy making. Yet, of all the issues raised under this section of 
‘institutions and procedures’, Question 8 on qualified majority threshold is the most 
important because it was the only one considered of ‘vital importance’ by both 
experts and, as seen in developments in the IGC in Rome in December, was one of the 
main reasons why the Constitutional draft was not ratified. With this in mind, we thus 
turn to a closer, more comparative, examination of Spain’s opposition. 
 
Spanish Opposition to Qualified Majority Threshold in Draft Constitution 
This section analyses why Spain sought preservation of Nice Treaty voting rules, a 
position commonly considered to be ‘defending the status quo’ due to national self-
interest. It should be noted at the outset that this stance runs counter to the historically 
‘pro-European integration’ stance that has characterised Spain.1 In order to gain 
insights into the Spanish position on the QMT, it is necessary to considers two main 
factors: first, the implications of the Constitution’s new rules in terms of both 
approving and blocking Council decisions and, secondly, the more theoretically based 
                                                 
1 Analyses concerning public opinion and political parties present empirical data supporting this pro-
European position of Spain. For a cultural account of this phenomenon concerning citizens see 
Jauregui, 2002; from a more utilitarian perspective see Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000; and for an analysis 
based on examination of political parties see Ruiz-Jimenez, 2002. 
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 claim of Spain regarding the Council of Ministers as a chamber of territorial 
representation in the European institutional system. 
 
Turning to the first main factor, in order to better understand how the new rules 
decrease Spain’s possibility to form a majority in the Council of Ministers, Graph 1 
depicts the political power in a 27 member-state European Union (EU-27) by using 
the Shapley-Shubik power index2. 
 
Graph 1. Shapley-Shubik Power Index to Form a Majority in the Council of Ministers 
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Majority requirements: 
Nice: 73.91% of votes (255/345)3 + 50% membership (14) + 62% population (2982/4810) in 10000. 
Constitution: 14/27 votes (50%) + 60% population (2886/4810) in 10000. 
 
Graph 1 highlights two main points. First, member states with a higher percentage of 
population over the total EU population (namely Germany, France, Italy and the 
United Kingdom) improve their influence on Council decisions adopted by the new 
Constitutional majority requirements compared with the voting system approved in 
Nice. Secondly, the bulk of member states are losers according to the new rules. In 
other words the Constitutional draft voting system reduces the political influence of 
several countries (both current member states like Belgium and Portugal, and 
                                                 
2 The Shapley-Shubik index considers the number of wining coalitions through the different 
permutations of the various actors involved in the coalition. The index focuses on the ‘pivotal actor’ 
which converts the wining coalition into a losing one; the index is thus related to the decisiveness of a 
political actor in a coalition. As such, the index is used broadly in these studies to consider the majority 
vote in the European Council. See Konig and Brauninger, 1998 and 2000. For power index calculations 
the IoP software is used (version 2.0): Thomas Bräuninger and Thomas König (2001) Indices of Power 
IOP 2.0 [computer program]. Konstanz: University of Konstanz [http://www.uni-
konstanz.de/FuF/Verwiss/koenig/IOP.html]. 
3 Several authors have underlined the inconsistencies for calculating the majority requirements 
according the Nice Treaty (Baldwin et al., 2001: p.43-44; Algaba et al. 2001: 15-16). The blocking 
minority threshold is set at 91 votes according to the Protocol on the enlargement of the European 
Union attached to the Nice Treaty. This fact has to be considered when estimating the majority 
requirements. Consequently, the blocking minority requirement implies that QMT corresponds to 255 
votes instead of 258 votes –74%– under Nice rules. 
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 newcomers like Hungary and the Czech Republic). With this in mind, one may 
reasonably ask: if other medium and small sized states (in terms of population) are 
equally negatively affected by the new rules in terms of their ability to form 
majorities, why have they not opposed the new voting system as vigorously as Spain? 
 
An answer to this is found by considering the effects of the new Constitution voting 
system on Spain’s capacity to block Council decisions. As several authors have noted, 
European policy-making involves several institutions working under different rules: 
the majority rule is the driving force in the European Parliament, whereas the 
European Council mainly operates through blocking minorities4. As such, analysis of 
the ability to form blocking minorities in the Council offers insights into the relative 
power position of any state. 
 
Based on ideas raised in the work of Algaba et al. (2004), who consider that the 
commonly used indexes (such as the SS and Banzhaf power indexes) can measure 
both the capacity to approve and block a decision, Graphs 2 and 3 estimate the 
blocking minority power for each national delegation under the Nice and Constitution 
rules. It is important to note that the chances of building a blocking minority depend 
on the criteria required to create a majority: in other words, considering that the Nice 
Treaty established three criteria to form a majority to pass legislation (based on 
population, vote and membership), there were three opportunities for member states 
to block such legislation. 
 
Graph 2. Shapley-Shubik Power Index to Form a Blocking Minority in the Council of 
Ministers 
BlockM Nice SS
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Blocking Minority options under Nice rules: 
                                                 
4 This is due to the characteristics of the European Council as an intergovernmentally-driven chamber, 
which deals with territorial representation that can veto legislation (in contrast to the Commission and 
Parliament which present a supranational profile). Hence, the use of power indexes can be considered 
in this contextual feature, and be applied also to the ability of political actors to block legislation. 
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 (a) Population: 39% (1877/4810). 
(b) Membership: 50% +1 (14/27). 
(c) Vote: 91/345. 
 
Graph 3. Shapley-Shubik Power Index to Form a Blocking Minority in the Council of 
Ministers 
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Blocking Minority options under the Draft Constitution rules: 
(a) Population: 41% (1972/4810). 
(b) Membership: 50% +1 (14/27). 
 
Graph 2 suggests that under Nice rules the membership criterion to form a blocking 
minority gave every member state the same political power to influence Council of 
Ministers’ decisions. However, the other two criteria to oppose legislation present an 
unequal distribution of political power to member states. Specifically, the chances to 
block legislation by means of the population criteria offer notable differences between 
member states. The blocking minority related to the vote criterion (that is, 91 votes 
over 345 in a EU-27) present an intermediate character in terms of the disparities in 
political power distribution. 
 
Graph 3 considers how this power position changes when considering the Draft 
Constitution provisions. The graph highlights how there is a notable reallocation of 
power when removing the ‘weighted vote’ criterion, especially when Poland and 
Spain are considered. This shift in the opportunities to block Council decision under 
the Constitution thus removes the privileged position held by these two countries in 
Nice. In fact, under Nice the power of influence of Spain and Poland was similar to 
the other four big member states while being simultaneously greater that the other 
member states (see Graph 2: squared-box line). Hence, Spain’s reluctance to accept 
the new rules is better understood when considering its loss of power to block Council 
decisions: although Spain loses political power in the Council of Ministers as do the 
bulk of member states except the big four (namely, France, Germany, United 
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 Kingdom, and Italy), the Spanish government’s rejection is based largely on this 
specific aspect of political power (blocking minority power). 
 
While the above analysis highlights that a prime reason for Spanish opposition is its 
lack of ability to form blocking minorities under the Draft Constitution’s proposals, a 
second, more theoretical, reason is based on Spain’s conception of what 
‘representation’ should entail in the Council of Ministers. One could argue that the 
adoption of the voting system involves two main elements. The first is an acceptable 
level of efficiency, that is, the probability of legislation being approved. This aspect is 
based on the likelihood of forming winning coalitions in order to support a law. A 
second element relates to a fair distribution of votes between members. In other 
words, the members represent different weightings according to several criteria (such 
as population or the socio-economic importance of each member state). The critical 
decision concerning the ‘level of efficiency’ of the voting system is to choose 
between unanimity and different majority combinations, whereas the crucial aspect 
regarding the ‘fair distribution’ criteria relates to the weightings of different political 
actors. By establishing two criteria in order to gain a majority of Council votes, the 
draft Constitution gains in efficiency but generates differences in the distribution of 
forces between member states. Baldwin et al. (2003, 7) have demonstrated this gain in 
efficiency by showing how the probability for passing legislation has grown from 
7.8% in Nice to 21.9% in the draft Constitution. 
 
This development has brought back to light the ongoing debate between small and big 
states in the European Union concerning the fairness of power distribution. But what 
is new is the tone of the current debate on the European Constitution regarding big 
and small states’ distribution of political power. For example, the Praesidium had in 
mind the implications of enlargement for big states as follows: 
 
‘In the first years, the weighted voting was the rule: ten votes for big states, 
five for medium states, and two votes for the smallest state. The big states 
were able to retain a comfortable majority. The successive enlargements have 
been targeted especially to small and medium states. These enlargements have 
changed the previous system. As a consequence, in a 25 member EU, the six 
states with the largest populations, which represent the 74% of the European 
Union’s total population, would only have 53% of the votes’. 
Source: D’Estaing, Amato & Dehaene (2003), ‘La falsa disputa entre paises 
‘pequeños’ y ‘grandes’, El País, Opinión, 17/XI/2003, p. 13 (authors’ 
translation from the original). 
 
Consequently, the Convention offered a double criterion in order to compensate the 
increment of small states versus the smaller number of big states (but with larger 
populations). The institutional reforms have focused on the Council voting system 
targeting its ‘level of efficiency’, but generating more discussion about the ‘fairness’ 
of the distribution of power (Felsenthal and Machover, 2003). 
 
With these ideas in mind, the Spanish Foreign Ministry’s defence of the Nice voting 
system is based on the idea that because the Council of Ministers is a second chamber 
dealing with territorial representation, an equal distribution of power should be 
required. As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in 2003: 
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 ‘… the basis for this supposed increased efficiency is rooted simply in the 
concentration of real decision-making power in fewer hands, basically the 
four largest Member States. To stretch the argument further, mathematically 
speaking, the most efficient decision-making system in a given group is one 
that places all the power in the hands of one individual: 100% efficiency. 
 
‘Moreover, it is somewhat surprising that those in favour of reforming the 
Nice voting system claim that the system proposed by the Convention is more 
democratic. This argument can only mean that, in their opinion, truly 
democratic representation is only that based on a purely proportional system –
which incidentally is not used in Member States, particularly those with Upper 
Houses in federal states–. The reverse argument would be that those who use 
corrective devices to facilitate representation of minority or weaker positions 
are not democratic. That is a political nonsense, which flies in the face of all 
modern developments in constitutional theory on democratic systems.’ 
Source: Spanish Foreign Ministry (ARI 125/2003). 
 
Section 2. Which Domestic Actors Have Been Involved and Why: 
Characterisation of the Policy-Making Process 
How can one better understand how the Spanish government arrived at its policy 
position on the draft Constitution? In order to answer this we will evaluate the internal 
coordination process and focus specifically on which domestic level actors have been 
most influential in shaping the Spanish position and why this is the case. Thereafter, 
we will consider how this coordination process can be better theoretically 
characterised in light of the different models raised earlier. 
 
Which actors were involved in shaping the position? 
Chart 1 considers the various actors that were involved in the formation of the 
Spanish position after the Convention was developed. 
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Graph 4. Domestic Coordination: The Case of Spain 
 
 
 
 
The Graph shows that the Convention first went through the International Relations 
and Security Office of the Prime Ministers’ Office (PMO) and then the Secretary of 
State for European Affairs (Alfonso Dastis, Secretary General) under the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (Minister Ana de Palacio). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs would 
then play a key role in establishing the ‘Coordinating Committee’ (task force; 
henceforth referred to as CC). CC, whose actions were coordinated by the General 
sub-directorate for European Affairs (under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 
consisted of representatives of all ministries. The CC’s main objective was to 
deliberate and discuss the governmental position on all aspects of the Convention. 
However, the main Ministry that would play a key role in terms of setting the 
direction of the Committee, as well as discussing any informal problems that may 
have emerged at CC meetings, was the Ministry of Finance (MEH) headed by 
Minister Rodrigo Rato. Rato would also be a key player as the Chairman of the 
Delegate Commission for Economic Affairs, which would approve final decisions 
made by the CC before they were rubber-stamped by the Cabinet. The PMO would 
also be involved in policy-making in the CC because, as one expert interviewer 
attested, there were also informal contacts throughout the process with the General 
sub-directorate of European Affairs (that coordinated the Committee) and MEH. 
 
The other two committees that were established during the process were the ‘Regional 
Committee,’ consisting of representatives of the Comunidades Autónomas, as well as 
the ‘Parliamentary Committee’ on European Affairs, consisting of House deputies 
(where representation was proportional to the number of seats). However, both of 
these committees, which represented other regional and partisan interests, were of 
limited importance: according to experts interviewed, these two other committees 
were informed of decisions taken in the CC, rather than influencing them. Evidence of 
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 this is seen when one examines how the desires and interests of those that played key 
roles in shaping outputs arrived at the CC –Foreign Affairs, the PMO and MEH 
shaped the government position that was not always reflective of other interests–. For 
example, as desired by officials from Foreign Affairs and the PMO, the Nice voting 
model was preferable because it meant more power for Spain, even though other 
opposition parties (such as the Socialists) as well as regional governments were 
willing to compromise on this position in order to attain consensus between all 
member states. And, as desired by Ministry of Economy (MEH) officials, the Spanish 
position favoured a free-market model over the social market model for Europe, even 
though several opposition party members and regional governments would have 
preferred otherwise. 
 
Given the evidence, one might argue that there are two main characteristics of the 
coordination process when the Spanish position on the draft Constitution was formed. 
First, the process was strongly centralised around three principal actors: the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the PMO, and the Ministry of Economy (MEH). The first played a 
key role in terms of coordinating the position, while the other two players informed, 
guided, supervised or supported the actions of Foreign Affairs at various stages of the 
process. Quite clearly, other potential actors, such as social, regional and partisan 
interests, were of limited relevance. Secondly, the policy-making process in which 
these three actors played principal roles can best be characterised as an informal one. 
As experts (both of whom were involved in the process) stated in interviews, outputs 
finally arriving at the CC would often be based on ideas raised in informal meetings, 
hallway discussions or simple phone calls, outside of ‘official business’ raised in 
meetings or public scrutiny through parliamentary debate. 
 
Explaining the characteristics of the policy-making process 
Why was the coordination process so tightly centred around three key actors (to the 
exclusion of other interests) and characterised by a sense of informality? Building on 
issues raised in Spanish political literature, we consider the importance of two main 
explanations. The first ponders the historical role of ‘a few strong institutional 
players’ in Spanish policy-making, while the second considers the ‘new foreign policy 
paradigm’ that guided the PP’s administration. 
 
First, strong centralisation around a few institutional players has characterised 
Spanish policy-making since the Socialist administrations of the 1980s. A good 
example is seen in privatisation policy-making during both the PSOE and PP 
administrations throughout the 80s and 90s when several companies of the National 
Industry Institute (INI) were sold by way of IPOs and trade sales (Chari, 1998; Chari 
and Cavatorta, 2002). Examination of the privatisation process reveals the decisive 
and exclusive role of three institutional actors that informally negotiated the different 
stages of the policy-process: the Ministry of Industry (to which the companies 
belonged), MEH (which was responsible for securing Treasury Funds for some of the 
sales that required the recapitilization of companies) and, to a lesser extent, the Prime 
Minister who would have the final say in some of the sales. Absent from this process 
were both parliamentary debate and interest group inputs, a similar dynamic also seen 
in labour market reform throughout the 1990s (Chari, 2001). The only difference in 
the main players involved in the INI sales, compared with those involved in forming 
the Spanish position towards the draft Constitution as above, was that Industry was 
involved in the privatisation policy-process (for the obvious reason that it was 
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 responsible for industrial policy), whereas Foreign Affairs was involved in shaping 
the position of the draft Constitution (for the equally obvious reason that this Ministry 
is responsible for external policy development.) In other words, both the PMO and 
MEH were key figures in the formulation of both policies and worked together with 
the other institutions responsible for policy-development in their specific areas. With 
this in mind, one might argue that a centralised policy-role for specific institutional 
actors has become guaranteed, or embedded, over time. The fact that the decision-
making process when the Spanish position on the Convention was formed involved 
only a few key institutional players that acted informally, simply reflects how all 
public policies are generally arrived at in Spain. 
 
A second explanation of the tight policy-process, which also highlights why Spain so 
staunchly defended Nice Treaty rules, relates to the ‘new foreign policy paradigm’ 
that drove all members of the PP administration. As Closa (2004) has argued, over the 
last four years the PP established a new ‘paradigm’ for Spanish foreign policy, where 
the traditional, almost blind, pro-European stance of Spain since 1976 has been 
altered by the PP on two fronts. First, the party sought to make Spain ‘more visible’ at 
the international level by forging ties with the US. This was most evident in Aznar’s 
taking Spain into the Iraq War with the US and the UK, despite the fact that over 85% 
of the population was against the war and wanted European states to find a solution 
together (Heywood, 2003; Chari and Cavatorta, 2003). Secondly, the PP wished to 
make Spain ‘more respected’ at the EU level. In doing so it was only interested in 
pursuing EU policy options that would ‘strengthen’ the Spanish position vis-à-vis 
other European superpowers such as Germany and France. One might argue that the 
effect of this ‘new paradigm’ on the policy process was to help further centralise it 
given that all policy-makers, consisting exclusively of members of the PP 
administration, would be working within a specific mind-set. By serving as a 
framework to guide policy participants, the ‘new paradigm’ also had the effect of 
excluding any other potential participants guided by different views on Spain’s 
international role (such as, for example, opposition parties and other social interests). 
 
Theoretical Characterisation of the Policy-Process 
Having examined the main actors involved in forming the Spanish position towards 
the draft Constitution and having considered why this was the case, it is useful to 
characterise the policy-process in the context of the different theoretical models that 
have guided Spanish policy-making literature as discussed at the beginning of the 
paper, namely corporatism, elitism and policy networks. It is difficult to suggest that 
the process is reflective of corporatist arrangements given that there was no 
guaranteed position for labour. Further, because the evidence does not suggest that 
there was a privileged role for economic actors, ideas raised by instrumental Marxists 
seem weak as well. 
 
Rather, the evidence does suggest that there were some elements of a policy 
community at play on four fronts. First, there were a limited number of participants 
that operated in a largely insulated fashion. Key here were the actions of the three 
main players –the PMO, MEH and Foreign Affairs– that acted almost exclusively in 
developing the Spanish position. Because other potential actors were consciously 
excluded, the process pointed to a highly restrictive membership. Secondly, general 
consensus was attained between the main actors and, significantly, there was ‘policy 
paradigm’, or a view of the world that guided and influenced the policy participants’ 
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 opposition to the draft Constitution’s qualified majority threshold. In this respect, the 
new ‘foreign policy paradigm’ that guided all (PP) participants is of significance. 
Thirdly, there was informal interaction between the different members. This was seen 
in evidence suggesting that arriving at a position often occurred in informal settings 
outside public scrutiny. And, finally, as seen in the dynamics of the Consultative 
Committee, one might argue that interaction between members might have taken 
place in a hierarchical fashion. Key here was the idea that Economy and Finance, 
along with the PMO, played a type of supervisory role for the Consultation 
Committee that was chaired by Foreign Affairs. 
 
Section 3. Conclusions and Reflections on the Effects of the Recent Socialist 
Victory  
This paper has examined how Spain has formed its national position towards the draft 
Constitutional proposal. It first highlighted that experts considered that Spain’s 
position, as developed by the Popular Party administration, was generally positive 
towards the constitutional draft. Nevertheless, Spain’s major problem of vital 
significance (which represented one of the main reasons for the failure to reach 
agreement in December 2003) related to the ‘qualified majority’ threshold. The paper 
argues that the PP preferred the Nice Treaty model because it allowed Spain more 
power to potentially block Council proposals, thereby ameliorating its power position 
vis-à-vis larger states such as the UK, France, Germany and Italy. Following this, the 
paper examined the internal coordination process and analysed the main actors that 
were most influential in shaping the Spanish position. The actors involved in the 
rather closed and centralised process involving a few players that informally 
interacted included high-ranking members from the Prime Minister’s Office and the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economy. Other potential participants, including 
opposition parties, regional interests and other social actors, were excluded from the 
process. In order to explain this rather closed and opaque, yet informal, process, two 
explanations were considered. The first suggested that this process is reflective of 
larger dynamics in Spanish policy-making since the mid 1980s, where the literature 
points to the same types of characteristics when economic and social policy is made. 
The second factor considered the significance of the new foreign policy ‘paradigm’ 
pursued by the PP, which sought to increase Spain’s international profile while 
increasing its strength and presence in the EU. It was argued that this paradigm not 
only served as a framework guiding the participants in the process, but also served as 
a barrier preventing other (non PP) actors to participate. From a theoretical 
perspective, the paper then attempts to place these findings in context of the larger 
Spanish policy-making literature as discussed at the beginning. It suggests that 
because domestic level coordination occurred in a rather closed, yet informal, venue 
that was comprised of a limited number of like-minded actors working in isolation, 
there was evidence pointing to a type of ‘policy-community’. 
 
Regardless of developments under the PP, however, the Spanish position towards the 
draft Constitution could significantly change over the next few weeks given the 
election of the Socialist Party led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Shortly after the 
election victory of 14 March 2004, Rodríguez Zapatero promised that his government 
would ‘solve’ the Constitutional crisis by taking a more conciliatory and 
compromising position towards the other member states and returning to a more 
‘integrationist’ view of Spain in the EU. Although no firm proposal have been made 
as of the time of writing, one solution may be to accept the qualified majority 
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 threshold as outlined in the draft Constitution, in exchange for more Spanish 
representation in the European Parliament. If past experience is a guide, the process 
for arriving at the Spanish position under the PSOE will not necessarily differ from 
that of the PP given the evidence raised here that suggests that foreign policy is 
developed in much the same way as economic and social policy in Spain over the last 
20 years. Nevertheless, the national position, or outcomes, finally arrived at by the 
Socialists may offer some hope for the rest of Europe given the return of the ‘pro-
European paradigm’ that has historically characterised Spain. 
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